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INTRODUCTION

For more than a year, the executive and legislative branches of
government and the media have trembled with indignation in reaction to repeated disclosures of payments by United States corporations to foreign nationals. These payments, often allegedly made for
the purpose of securing foreign business for the companies involved,
have attracted the attention of congressional committees' and executive agencies 2 and have resulted in litigation and consent settlements approved by the district courts.' The reverberations of these
disclosures have produced turbulence overseas, most notably in
4

Japan .

Notwithstanding the uproar, relatively little has been accomplished in the way of preventing a resumption or continuation of the
practice. Indeed, some uncertainty exists whether outright bribery
of a foreign agent by a domestic firm seeking to secure sales is
prohibited by the laws of the United States. While the Securities
and Exchange Commission claims the power to require disclosure
in some instances, it seeks legislation to fortify its authority,5 and
it is entirely unclear whether the payments themselves can be challenged if disclosure is properly made. When bribery is used to further conspiracies that restrain domestic or foreign trade of the
United States or conduct that monopolizes or attempts to monopolize such trade, it should become a matter of concern to those empowered to enforce federal antitrust laws.'
One of the more intriguing and imaginative approaches to these
payment practices is contained in a report to the Senate Banking
Committee by the Secretary of Commerce on behalf of the Ford
Administration Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments
1. Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational CorporationsAbroad before
the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings]; Hearings on
Multinational Corporationsand U.S. ForeignPolicy before the Subcomm. on Multinational
Corporationsof the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12 (1975).

2.

SEC

REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES,

submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee (May 12, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT].
3. See, e.g., SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,226 (S.D.N.Y., filed
July 7, 1975); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Civ. No. 76-0611 (D.D.C., filed April 13, 1976);
SEC v. Northrop Corp., Civ. No. 75-563 (D.D.C., filed April 18, 1976).
4. See N.Y. Times, July 24, 1976, § 3, at 31, col. 5; N.Y. Times, July 28, 1976, § 1, at
1, col. 2; K. Willenson, Japan:Sordid Maneuvers, NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1976.
5. SEC REPORT, supranote 2, at 57. See also Stevenson, The SEC and ForeignBribery,
32 Bus. LAW. 53 (1976).
6. 1975 Hearings,supra note 1, at 86.
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Abroad. Evaluating the potential reach of American antitrust laws,
the task force observed:
Section 2(c) of the Clayton Act prohibits the payment of commissions or other
allowances, except for services actually rendered, in connection with the sale
of goods in which either the buyer or seller is engaged in commerce (including
commerce with foreign nations). Section 2(c) encompasses commercial bribery
and bribes of state government officials to secure business at the expense of
U.S. competitors. Although there do not appear to be any Section 2(c) cases
involving dealings with foreign governments, the statute might be applicable
to the payment of a bribe by a U.S. corporation to a foreign official to assist
7
its business at the expense of its U.S. competitors.

A second interesting, yet untested, approach is contained in the
statement of Donald I. Baker, former Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy investigating the activities of American multinational corporations abroad. Elaborating
upon the flexibility and adaptability of the Sherman Act, Mr. Baker
remarked:
The basic task of the Antitrust Division is enforcement of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. sec.1, et seq.). As you will recall, this act is also available to private
plaintiffs bringing civil treble damage actions (15 U.S.C. sec. 15). And indeed
in the foreign area a great many of the cases are brought. It is the particular
genius of this statute that in declaring illegal both conspiracies to restrain
trade and monopolizing conduct, it does not become necessary to delineate
possible means which might be employed to achieve these objectives. This
gives the statute not only elegance of form, but extraordinary adaptability to
new situations. Thus, the Sherman Act does not need to and does not in fact
declare illegal any specific business practice such as bribery. Rather it focuses
on the purpose and effect of conspiratorial behavior which restrains trade or
8
individual or joint conduct leading to monopolization.

This Article examines the feasibility and desirability of
marshalling section 2(c)' of the Clayton Act as amended by the
0
Robinson-Patman Act and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
7. Letter from Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of Commerce, to Senator William Proxmire, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, June 11, 1976
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
8. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 87-88.
9. Section 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(1) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage,
or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services
rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either
to the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the
direct or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom
such compensation is so granted or paid.
10. Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975), provides:
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against a practice having deep legal, political, and emotional significance in the United States and overseas. Difficult questions of jurisdiction and coverage are presented, as are major issues of public
policy on what the role, if any, should be for these provisions.
II.

A.

JURISDICTION

Section 2(c)-The "Commerce" JurisdictionIssue

Whether the practice of commercial bribery of a foreign official
for the purpose of consummating a sale is within the jurisdictional
scope of section 2(c) depends in large measure on whether the
"brokerage clause" can be construed as coextensive for jurisdictional purposes with the basic price discrimination provision of the
statute. If so, the payments in question probably cannot be reached
by the Robinson-Patman Act.
Authority for the proposition that discriminatory prices involving a United States firm's sales overseas are not subject to section
2(a) derives from the jurisdictional element of that section, which
Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing contained in sections 1
to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices
for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the
trademark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and which
is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or
distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as
applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is
to be made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and the
making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition
under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not
make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance
of minimum resale prices on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers,
or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors,
or between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each
other. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
42 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
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requires that the commodities in question must be "sold for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other
place under the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ."" Since the
products in the bribery cases are sold "for use, consumption, or
resale" abroad, the transactions seem plainly beyond the Act, and
the inquiry can be concluded.' 2 The current situation involving payments to foreign nations differs from that covered by the Supreme
Court in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.,1 3 in which the Court held
that the Act covers intrastate sales by a seller who makes sales from
the same location to out-of-state customers at a higher price. A
discriminatorily low price to foreign customers, even if subsidized
by higher prices in the domestic market, would be outside the scope
of section 2(a) since, unlike the local sales in Moore, all the sales in
question would not be within the United States or its possessions.
Authority exists, however, to the effect that section 2(c) has its
own jurisdictional base and practices that may not be reached as
price discriminations under section 2(a) can be attacked as unlawful
brokerage or commission payments under section 2(c). This issue
was faced directly in Baysoy v. Jessup Steel Co.' 4 The defendantseller sought to avoid its contractual obligation to deliver the commodities involved in an export transaction on the ground that the
sales agreement, which provided for a commission fee payment to
the buyer, was unlawful under section 2(c). The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss notwithstanding the buyer's contention
that section 2(c) does not cover export transactions. Conceding that
a price discrimination under section 2(a) would not be covered, the
court concluded that the jurisdictional limitations of the price discrimination provision are inapplicable to section 2(c). The only limitation on the latter section is that the transaction must be consummated in the course of "commerce" by a person engaged in
"commerce." According to the court, the term "commerce" is to be
construed as defined in section 1 of the Clayton Act, which includes
trade with foreign nations.
Although criticized as aberrational, 5 Baysoy has been followed
Robinson-Patman Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
See ROWE, PRICE DIscIuMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 81-82 (1962);
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS, Vol. 4, § 26.0311] (1975).
13. 348 U.S. 115 (1954). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 n.17
(1974), the Court was careful to reaffirm and distinguish the Moore rationale.
14. 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
15. ROWE, supra note 12, at 82. Rowe argues that "in light of an explicit Congressional
intention to shield American firms' discriminatory export sales or 'dumping' from Robinson11.
12.
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in the one subsequent decision in which the jurisdictional issue
appears to have been raised squarely. The complaint in Canadian
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc. 6 charged a conspiracy to defraud plaintiff by bribing plaintiff's chief buyer. Defendants sought dismissal of the second count of the complaint, which
charged violations of section 2(c), arguing that the RobinsonPatman Act in its entirety does not apply to transactions occurring
in foreign commerce. Relying on Baysoy and its interpretation of the
legislative history, the court concluded that the jurisdictional limitation of section 2(a) is inapplicable to section 2(c).
Older cases indicate that section 2(a) and sections 2(c), (d), and
(e) are independent of one another and that no justification can be
made for reading the scope, terms, and defenses of one provision
into another. Thus, in the seminal case of Oliver Bros., Inc. v.
FTC,7 the court of appeals asserted:
three specific matters were forbidden as unfair trade practices by subsections
(c)(d) and (e), viz.: the granting of commission or brokerage, or any allowance
in lieu thereof, to the other party to the transaction or his agent, the making
of discriminatory payments by seller to buyer for services rendered by the
latter and discrimination by the seller in the rendering of services to the buyer.
It is perfectly clear that all three of these practices were forbidden because of
their tendency to lessen competition and create monopoly, without regard to
their effect in a particular case; and there is no reason to read into the sections
prohibiting them the limitations contained in section 2(a) having relation to
price discrimination....,1

Moreover, the promotional allowance provision has been construed
to be independent of section 2(a) by a finding that the "commerce"
element is supplied if the disproportional payment crosses state
lines, even though the goods to which it relates may not. 9
Patman consequences [80 Cong. Rec. 6333 (1936)], Baysoy appears aberrational." He predicts that future rulings will construe jurisdictional aspects of all sections of the RobinsonPatman Act similarly. Contra, W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr
(1963). In discussing the jurisdictional limitation placed on § 2(a), Congressman Patman
observed:
This delimitation [of 2(a)] is not found in the remaining clauses of the Act, which apply
to payment for the use of services and facilities used in furthering the movement of the
goods involved in the sales transaction. These clauses apply to any person engaged in
commerce.... To determine the limit and scope of such commerce we must turn to
the definition found in the Clayton Act itself.
PATMAN, ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 208 (1938).
16. 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
17. 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
18. Id. at 767. See also, Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1946); Edison Produce Co., 60 F.T.C. 1 (1962).
19. Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 971 (1964).
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These cases seem contrary, however, to a more recent trend
toward mutual accommodation and reconciliation of the Act's various subsections. The Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Henry
Broch & Co. 20 presaged the intrusion of the element of discrimination into section 2(c) that even the Federal Trade Commission
seems to have adopted. 21 No rational justification can be asserted
for basing the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act on the
essentially accidental circumstances whether a concession is made
in the form of a lower price or a broker's fee or allowance. Possibly,
however, different considerations properly are present when no concession to the buyer is involved but rather the conduct amounts to
a gratuity to his faithless servant. In any event no authority appears
to require harmonizing the "commerce" elements of sections 2(a)
and 2(c), and analysis of the tendency to blend other aspects of the
two provisions may best be addressed to the substantive questions
relative to coverage of bribery under the brokerage clause.
B.

The Sherman Act-"Foreign Commerce"

The Sherman Act prohibitions apply to trade or commerce not
"only among the several states," but also "with foreign nations. 22
These words have generated endless controversy centered on the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. The traditional
starting point in determining whether the Sherman Act applies to
particular conduct is the "choice of law analysis" that has evolved
in tort actions. This analysis requires the legality of an act to be
judged by the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurs.3 In
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 4 the plaintiff complained of allegedly predatory acts committed by defendant in Cen20. 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
21. See Garrett, Holmes & Co., 67 F.T.C. 237 (1965); Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 65 F.T.C.
1099 (1964), rev'd on other grounds sub noma.Flotill Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1966), rev'd 389 U.S. 179 (1967); Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962). In both Jewel
Companies, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1213, 1243 (1974), aff'd id. at 1273, and Food Fair Stores, Inc., 83
F.T.C. 1213 (1974), afl'd id. at 1273, the administrative law judges granted respondents'
motions for summary decision largely on the ground that complainant counsel stipulated that
discrimination would not be proven. The Commission allowed the initial decisions to take
effect without "necessarily" agreeing in all respects with their rationale.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
23. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, stated: "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done." Id. at 356.
24. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). The complaint in American Banana did not clearly allege
impact upon United States imports, but the Court did not remark upon the absence. See P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 126 n.443 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA].
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tral America. Plaintiff claimed to have sustained injury because the
alleged acts preserved defendant's domination of banana exports to
the United States, the home country of both corporations. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, concluded that plaintiff did not
state a cause of action under the Sherman Act since the acts of
which plaintiff complained were committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States and were legal under the laws of
the jurisdiction where they were performed.
Two constructions of this case are possible in view of subsequent cases that have distinguished American Banana and have
upheld the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act over acts abroad substantially affecting U.S. commerce. These cases hold either that no
such effects were shown in AmericanBananaor that the acts abroad
were those of a foreign sovereign.2 5 For example, in United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp.,28 a combination entered into within the United
States for the purpose of monopolizing an article of commerce produced abroad was held to violate the Sherman Act. The Court found
the conduct illegal even though defendant's control of production
was aided by discriminatory legislation of the foreign country that
established an official agency as the sole buyer of the product, and
further, even though an individual defendant had been the exclusive
selling agent for that governmental authority. The Court's decision
was based on the impact that the activities of defendants had within
the United States and upon its foreign trade. American Bananawas
expressly held inapplicable.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,27 held that a Canadian corporation violated the Sherman
Act by impliedly agreeing with European aluminum producers to
avoid the United States market.2 1 Judge Learned Hand, speaking
for the court, concluded that any "state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends. ' 12 The court held the Sherman Act is applicable to any con-

spiracy that is intended to and does affect United States imports
and exports, if the conspiracy would be illegal if perpetuated in the
25. W.

FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTrrRUST LAWS

41 (2d ed. 1973).

26. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
27. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
28. Although the American company, Alcoa, was not held to be a member of this
agreement, the foreign cartel's actions were presumably intended to induce Alcoa to stay out
of Europe. The evidence might have justified treating Alcoa and the Canadian company as a
single entity, but the district court held otherwise. AREEDA, supra note 24, at 126 n.446.
29. 148 F.2d at 443.
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United States." Interestingly, the court also indicated that when an
intent to cause effects within the United States is proved, the burden of proof shifts to defendants to disprove effects within the
United States. 1
Similarly, in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp.,3 2 the Supreme Court held that a conspiracy between an
American corporation and its Canadian subsidiary to monopolize
the vanadium market was subject to the antitrust laws because of
the parent corporation's conduct within the United States. Although the conspiracy was consummated in Canada, the Court concluded that a "conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or
foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of
the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of
occurs in foreign countries. ' 33 Thus, even if much of the conspiratorial behavior occurs outside the United States, the conspiracy
does not escape the extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act.34 More recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its view
that a conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act simply because part of the conduct occurs in foreign countries. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,3 5 the Court
held that it was illegal for American firms to cooperate in a Canadian patent pooling arrangement that had the intended effect of
limiting American exports of electronic products to Canada by nonparticipants in the pool.
Thus United States courts have made clear that Sherman Act
prohibitions may be applied to conspiracies formed and carried out
abroad when such conspiracies have the intended and actual effect
of restraining American imports or exports. 3 What makes the in30. Id.
31. Id. at 444.
32. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
33. Id. at 704.
34. In the commercial bribery situation, much of the activity, including corporate
decision-making and arranging to make funds available, has a physical site in the United
States.
35. 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See also United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818
(N.D. Cal. 1957), in which the district court stated:
But assuming, arguendo, that the conspiracy at least "has its situs" in Japan and that
most acts in furtherance of the conspiracy have been done in Japan, this does not deprive
the court of jurisdiction where, as here, the conspiracy is alleged to operate as a direct
and substantial restraint on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States.
Id. at 822.
36. In a recent Ninth Circuit opinion the "effects" test was criticized as being incomplete for failing to consider the other nation's interest. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
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stant inquiry more difficult, however, are the collateral considerations that must be weighed in determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction properly may be exercised. These considerations are
37
discussed later in the Article.
I.

A.

THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT

Commercial Bribery Under the Substantive Provisions of
Section 2(c)

Not surprisingly, the facts underlying questionable payments
to foreign officials are not readily available, particularly insofar as
they might illuminate whether a payment can be construed as a
brokerage fee, commission, or other similar payment to an agent for
a foreign government customer. The SEC summaries of reports received from various domestic corporations are vague and raise questions relative to the scope of section 2(c).1
Nevertheless, some allegations of the SEC, if accepted as true,
describe a practice closely approaching those that have been held
cognizable under section 2(c) in situations involving domestic commerce. The Commission's complaint against Lockheed Aircraft, for
example, alleges that from 1967 to 1975 the company expended
approximately 25 million dollars in payments to foreign officials, in
part, for the purpose of securing the business of their governments.3 '
America, 797 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) G-1 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1976). Judge Choy,
speaking for the court suggests:
[iun some cases the direct and substantial effect test . . . might open the door too
widely by sanctioning jurisdiction over an action when comity considerations would
dictate dismissal. At other times, it might fail in the other direction, dismissing a case
for which comity does not require forbearance, thus closing the jurisdictional door too
tightly since the Sherman Act prohibits some restraints which do not have a direct and
substantial effect.
Id. at G-6. As an alternative, the Ninth Circuit adopted a balancing approach:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business
or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad. A court evaluating these factors should identify the potential degree of conflict
if American authority is asserted. . . . Having assessed the conflict, the courts should
then determine whether in the face of it the contacts and interests of the United States
are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Id. at G-7.
37. See text accompanying notes 118-51 infra.
38. SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at Exhibit B.
39. Id. at B-23. SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Civ. No. 76-0611 (D.D.C., filed April
13, 1976).
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In the same general vein, the report of Northrop Corporation, filed
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, explains that
payments of approximately 450,000 dollars had been made to an
agent of the company with knowledge that the money would be
conveyed to two foreign officials and that substantial additional
amounts were paid to organizations whose principals were foreign
officials or were connected closely with foreign officials. 0
Nevertheless, not every payment by a United States corporation to an official in a nation where it does business automatically
raises questions that even conceptually are within the ambit of section 2(c). The payment might be made merely to promote the general acceptability of the company in the nation; it may be a fee
permitted or required as a condition of doing business under foreign
law; or it may be a payment made to prevent hostile government
action. The applicability of the "brokerage provision" of the
Robinson-Patman Act to these types of payments is questionable.
The applicability of section 2(c) may turn on close factual issues
concerning the purpose and use of the payment. The required information concerning the use of the payment may be wholly in foreign
hands and not susceptible to discovery, especially assuming that the
payment under consideration is a bribe to a foreign official for the
purpose of consummating a particular sale.
Approximately a decade ago few would have disputed that
commercial bribery undertaken for sales purposes was covered by
section 2(c). The courts and Federal Trade Commission, however,
increasingly have scrutinized the link between payments or concessions and brokerage fees or commissions. Moreover, a discernible
trend has developed in the cases to weave the section 2(a) element
of discrimination into section 2(c). Both developments have a significant bearing on whether section 2(c) can reach payments to foreign
officials.
(1)

Is the Payment a Brokerage Fee or Commission?

Identification of a payment or allowance as a fee or commission
to the other party in a transaction or to his agent consistently has
plagued the government and private plaintiffs in section 2(c) cases.'
Problems arise more often when an allowance "in lieu of" brokerage
40. SEC v. Northrop, Civ. No. 75-563 (D.D.C., filed April 16, 1976).
41. See 1975 Hearings,supra note 1, at 90-94.
42. See Rill, Brokerage Under the Robinson-PatmanAct: Toward a New Certainty, 41
NoTRE DAME LAw. 337, 341-46 (1966).
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to the buyer is alleged rather than a direct payment to the buyer's
agent. These allowances have withstood attack in litigated cases as
being no more than irregular price concessions,4 3 functional discounts," or promotional allowances or similar payments for nonbrokerage considerations. 5 The same uncertainty would arise regarding payments to the buyer's agent, especially if it cannot be
shown clearly that the recipient functions as a purchasing intermediary. For example, a complainant apparently would have a difficult road to successful litigation under section 2(c) in the case of a
payment to a buyer's marketing agency that is asserted to have been
made for promotional purposes.46
The identification problems are compounded in attempts to
grapple with payments to agents of foreign nations. In many instances, the complainant will be unable to determine whether a payment was in connection with a sales transaction or series of sales
transactions. The wording of section 2(c), however, appears to require such a connection. The section proscribes, as here relevant,
brokerage, commission, or similar payments to a buyer's agent
". .. in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares or
merchandise. . .. -"7Moreover, the statute twice refers to "such
transaction," corroborating the need for a specific nexus between a
sales "transaction" and the payment, although the antecedent for
"such" is unclear.
The government's complaint in the Lockheed case illustrates a
set of facts that if proved could bring a payment at least within the
transactional relationship required by section 2(c). According to
paragraph eleven of the complaint:
During the period from at least 1968 and continuing to at least September
1975, defendants Lockheed, Haughton, Kotchian and others engaged in a
course of business whereby they made or caused to be made secret payments
of at least $25 million (at times in cash) to foreign government officials to aid
43. See, e.g., Main Fish Co., 53 F.T.C. 88 (1956); Trade Practice Conference Rules for
the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 74.2(g) (1976).
44. Hruby Distrib. Co., 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
45. Central Retail-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963). An outright payment for which no particular services are performed or expected would seem to be
outside the scope of § 2(c). Such payments to buyers have been considered to be beyond the
reach of § 2(d), and the same principles should apply to the brokerage provision. Cf. Yakima
Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693 (1961) (payments must be made to a customer as
consideration for services or facilities furnished by the customer in connection with the seller's
product).
46. See Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693 (1961). But see Tillie Lewis
Foods, Inc., 65 F.T.C. 1099 (1964).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970).
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Lockheed in procuring and maintaining certain contracts with foreign government customers and in expediting certain permits necessary to perform existing contracts."

Specific payments probably would not be required to be linked
to specific sales in order to satisfy the transactional element of the
statute. Thus, in Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons,49 the
Ninth Circuit approved the trial court's finding that a series of
payments by the defendant were made to a state purchasing agent
for the purpose and with the result of generating a large volume of
sales over more than six years, and concluded that the payments
were covered by section 2(c). Nevertheless, no case under the
subsection appears in which liability has been found in the absence
of a proven direct relationship between payments and the consummation of sales. The reference in the Lockheed complaint to procuring and maintaining certain contracts (which covered sales by Lockheed to foreign governments) appears to contemplate payments relative to specific sales transactions provided for in section 2(c).10
Payments to agents of foreign governments, however, can be
made for various purposes not directly related to specific sales transactions. As explained by then Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Donald I. Baker in his 1975 testimony before a House committee,
payments to foreign officials can be made for favorable considerations in general. 5' Indeed, under the practice if not the law of some
foreign countries, "palm greasing" may b the nauseating prerequisite to a satisfactory commercial climate or perhaps to the right
to trade at all. Establishing that the individual recipient has any
procurement responsibilities may be difficult, as would be proving
that he is an official or conduit for the payment of money to an
official. Under these circumstances, the question remains whether
the necessary connection between payment and the closing of a sale
can be made.52 The problems raised by the need for a sales transaction link, while substantial, are largely evidentiary and practical.
Deeper issues of law and policy are presented by the question
whether continued justification exists for applying what is essentially a price discrimination law to commercial bribery.
48. Complaint for Defendant at T 11, SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Civ. No. 76-0611
(D.D.C. filed April 13, 1976).
49. 351 F.2d 851, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1965).
50. Since the Lockheed case was settled and since the connection between alleged
payments and specific transactions would probably not have been relevant to the SEC charge,
the complaint allegations were not fleshed out to provide a more concrete illustration of the
factual setting herein considered. Civ. No. 76-0611 (D.D.C., filed April 13, 1976).
51. 1975 Hearings, supra note 1, at 90.
52. See Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co., 59 F.T.C. 693 (1961).
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Is the Coverage of Bribery Under Section 2(c) Consistent With
the Purposes of the Act?

As early as 1943, in Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light &
Power Co.,5" bribery of a buyer's purchasing agents was held to
violate section 2(c). In that case, a buyer successfully maintained
an action against its former president under the brokerage section
for having received payments from sellers of coal. The court expressly differentiated section 2(a), dealing with discrimination,
from section 2(c), concluding that the latter prohibited "unfair
trade practice" or bribery that precludes competitors from obtaining business.54
More than twenty years after Fitch, the Ninth Circuit, in
Rangen v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc.,55 affirmed a judgment under
section 2(c) for a seller against a competitor who had allegedly obtained business from the State of Idaho by bribing its purchasing
agent. The defendants expressly raised the argument that commercial bribery was not covered by a statute which had as its basic
thrust the elimination of discriminatory pricing practices. The court
rejected this contention, concluding that the elements of a section
2(c) and section 2(a) offense are entirely different at least when a
direct payment to a buyer's agent is made as distinguished from an
allowance "inlieu of" brokerage to the buyer, and that, particularly
in the direct payment situation, price discrimination was not an
element of the offense. 6 The court further held that commercial
bribery was within the proper scope of section 2(c), which had as
an objective the prevention of practices "tending to undermine the
fiduciary relationship between a buyer and its agent. . . ."I' No
question appears to have been raised about the propriety of applying section 2(c) to bribery of foreign buyers' agents by the two district courts that have addressed the issue. The Baysoy and
CanadianIngersoll-Rand cases involved, however, the jurisdictional
prerequisite of foreign commerce rather than any substantive ques58
tion under section 2(c).
53. 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
54. Id. at 16.
55. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965).
56. Id. at 857. In reaching the conclusion that § 2(c) cases do not require proof of
discrimination, the court relied on what may now be outdated opinions of the Ninth and
Fourth Circuits, FTC v. Washington Fish & Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1959); Southgate
Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945).
57. 351 F.2d at 858.
58. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
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Until very recently, one could have argued that the commercial
bribery application of section 2(c) had been wasted by time, and in
light of events in the 1960's and 70's, was no longer appropriate. Two
appellate court decisions in 1976, however, one in the Ninth Circuit
and one in the Seventh, indicate that forecasts of the demise of this
use of the brokerage clause are premature. In Calnetics Corp. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 59 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its
Rangen decision that commercial bribery that undermines a fiduciary relationship in order to consummate a sales transaction is
cognizable under section 2(c). Calnetics involved the section 2(c)
claim of a customer whose sales manager was receiving commissions
on purchases from a supplier." Unlike the plaintiffs in Fitch, the
customer in Calnetics did not contend that he had been forced to
pay inflated prices, but rather he argued that he had been forced to
buy an inferior product, causing consumer dissatisfaction and loss
of good will. The court of appeals overruled the lower court's dismissal of the claim, concluding:
The alleged violations in the instant case no less involve the undermining of
fiduciary relationships than did those in Fitch or Rangen. We hold that, if the
distributor is able on remand to prove that counterdefendants indeed committed acts of commercial bribery in violation of § 2(c), then the defendants ought
to be allowed any damage proximately caused by that violation."1

More recently, in Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co.,62 the Seventh Circuit followed the Sixth and Ninth Circuits and held that section
2(c) prohibits payments in the nature of bribes made to consummate a sale. The plaintiff in Grace was the trustee for a bankrupt
seafood wholesaler whose sales manager was also president of a
competitor. The competitor made sales to the wholesaler on which
a commission was paid to the common officer. A finding of injury
was based on an assumption that the amount of commission to the
double agent inflated the price paid by the bankrupt. Curiously,
the court also found injury resulting from a deprivation of plaintiff's
corporate opportunity that would have produced payments to the
wholesaler of the commissions involved. The court observed, however, that the transaction constituted an indirect price discrimination because the victim was forced to pay a higher price in purchasing foods through defendant than defendant, a competitor, was
59. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1976).
60. The legal theory underlying a claim by a competing supplier arising out of the same
allegations does not appear to have been questioned. 532 F.2d at 687.
61. Id. at 696.
62.

774 ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-12 (7th Cir. July 22, 1976).
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forced to pay for seafood brought from independent suppliers. Thus
the issue whether price discrimination is an element of the section
2(c) offense by the Seventh Circuit seems unsettled.
If price discrimination is a necessary element of the offense,
problems of proof will be increased greatly. A number of significant
developments have occurred in the past decade that suggest a new
construction of section 2(c), which more nearly harmonizes the section with the principal objectives of the price discrimination law.
Notwithstanding Calnetics and Grace, those developments may
undercut the continued vitality of section 2(c) as a weapon against
commercial bribery.
The spark of reanalysis was ignited by the Supreme Court's
first Broch decision, which focused on the capacity of a brokerage
concession to operate as a hidden price discrimination.6 3 The Court
held that preferential treatment accorded a buyer in part through
a reduced fee paid by the seller to the buyer's broker was unlawful
under section 2(c) and was the kind of discriminatory practice that
the statute was designed to prevent. According to the Court's overview, the section's central thrust was exemplified as follows:
One of the favorite means of obtaining an indirect price concession was by
setting up dummy brokers who were employed by the buyer and who, in many
cases, rendered no services. The large buyers demanded that the seller pay
"brokerage" to these fictitious brokers who then turned it over to their employer. This practice was one of the chief targets of § 2(c) of the Act. But it
was not the only means by which the brokerage function was abused and
Congress in its wisdom phrased § 2(c) broadly, not only to cover the other
methods then in existence but all other means by which brokerage would be
used to effect price discrimination."

The quoted language is in accord with statements from the legislative history describing the purposes of section 2(c). The House Committee explained:
The object of the bill briefly stated is to amend section 2 of the Clayton

Act so as to suppress more effectually discriminations between customers of
the same seller not supported by sound economic differences in their business
positions or in the cost of serving them. Such discriminations are sometimes
effected directly in prices, including terms of sale; and sometimes by separate
allowances to favored customers for purported services or other considerations
which are unjustly discriminatory in their result against other customers. The
bill is accordingly drawn in six lettered subsections, of which the first four (a),
(b), (c) and (d), contain substantive measures directed at the more prevalent
forms of discrimination. 5
63.
64.
65.
2d Sess.

FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1960).
Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); see S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong.,
3 (1936).
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The Committee's explanations of the brokerage provision further
focused on the coercive power used by large buyers to obtain preferences, and again the evil of discrimination was stressed:
Among the prevalent modes of discrimination at which this bill is directed
is the practice of certain large buyers to demand the allowance of brokerage
direct to them upon their purchases, or its payment to an employee, agent, or
corporate subsidiary whom they set up in the guise of a broker, and through
whom they demand that sales to them be made.6

The implications of the Broch decision, that discrimination is
an element in section 2(c) direct payment cases, were considered
and rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Rangen.67 The court relied on
a footnote in Broch citing congressional debates suggesting that
bribery of a seller's broker by the buyer would be covered under
section 2(c). In context, however, the footnote appears merely to
expand the Supreme Court's basic theme that section 2(c) reaches
all means of effecting discrimination, and bribery of a seller's broker
8
may be one way to obtain a lower price.
Federal Trade Commission decisions and related actions subsequent to Broch uniformly appear to have included price discrimination as an element of the offense in both discount and direct payment cases. In Hruby Distributing Co., 9 the Commission in 1962
found that functional discounts paid a wholesaler were not brokerage fees even though so labeled by the parties, relying in part on the
dissimilarity of respondent's operations witl those subject to section
2(c). The Commission observed:
Hruby is clearly not a "dummy" broker controlled by a large buyer to whom
he passes on phony brokerage payments. Equally clearly, he is not himself a
powerful wholesaler or retail chain exacting from his suppliers false brokerage
payments, to the competitive disadvantage of his smaller competitors. And,
finally, it is clear that the discounts received by Hruby are not granted because
on sales to him sellers could dispense with brokerage services regularly required on their sales, thus effecting savings of usual brokerage fees. 0
66. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1936). The Senate Committee Report
more explicitly identified the type of practice with which Congress was concerned:
But to permit [a brokerage] payment of allowance where no such service is rendered,
where in fact, if a "broker," so labeled, enters the picture at all, it is one whom the buyer
points out to the seller, rather than one who brings the buyer to the seller, is but to
permit the corruption of this function to the purposes of competitive discrimination.
S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
67. 351 F.2d at 856.
68. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 n.6. The congressional debates referred to are at 80 CONG. REc. 7759-60, 8111-12 (1936).
69. 61 F.T.C. 1437 (1962).
70. Id. at 1447-48.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:131

Two years later, the Commission framed the issue in another case
of alleged brokerage discounts to be whether an allowance was a
brokerage payment- if it was given only to a favored customer." In
Garrett-Holmes & Co., also a buyer case, a violation was found
because
[t]here is no evidence that the buyer rendered any services to the seller ...
nor that anything in its method of dealing justified
72 its getting a discriminatory
price as "brokerage" or discounts in lieu thereoL

Possibly the most forthright Commission expression regarding the
elements of section 2(c) is found in an amicus brief filed by the
agency in a private action:
The crucial question in every case brought under Section 2(c) is whether the

buyer is receiving preferential treatment effected through the payment of brokerage or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof."

The most recently contested section 2(c) proceedings before the
Commission were the "Lettuce Brokerage" cases, involving initially
seventeen brokers, buyers, and individuals in the produce industry.
A violation was alleged to have occurred as a result of receipt of fees
by brokers who were allegedly representatives or under the direct or
indirect control of buyers. 4 The cases were determined on crossmotions for summary judgment, with complaint counsel conceding
that:
no evidence [would be offered] that the acts and practices of respondents
alleged in the complaint in this matter have resulted in price discrimination
or may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or
injure, destroy or prevent competition."

Summary decision was granted by both administrative law judges
responsible for the adjudication, largely because of the absence of
proof that any price discrimination had been granted. 6 In adopting
71. Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc., 65 F.T.C. 1099, 1138 (1964).
72. 67 F.T.C. 237 at 254 (1965) (citing FTC v. Henry Broch & Co.).
73. Brief of FTC as amicus curiae at 5, Empire Rayon Yarn Co. v. American Viscose
Corp., 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). See also Modem Marketing Services,
Inc., 71 F.T.C. 1676, 1685-86 (1967).
74. Jewel Companies, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1243 (1974); Food Fair Stores, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1213
(1974).
75. Jewel Companies, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1243, 1249 (1974) (initial decision).
76. Jewel Companies, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 1243, 1254 (1974); Food Fair Stores, Inc., 83
F.T.C. 1213, 1229-30 (1974). In the Jewel initial decision, the administrative law judge noted
with approval but distinguished the bribery cases, apparently agreeing with the breach of
fiduciary duty theory. 83 F.T.C. at 1251. The approving reference seems at odds with the
administrative law judge's more careful inclusion of discrimination as an element of the
offense.
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the dismissals ordered by the administrative law judges, the Commission avoided the discrimination issue, holding only that the evidence that complaint counsel would offer could not establish that
the brokers were acting for or in behalf of or subject to the direct or
7
indirect control of the buyers.

1

If discrimination is an element of the offense, the principles of
fiduciary responsibility that purport to justify coverage of commercial bribery seemingly are not controlling in section 2(c) litigation.
For present purposes, one would have extreme difficulty showing
that a bribe to a foreign official resulted in a discriminatory disadvantage to any other buyer with whom the Robinson-Patman Act
might be concerned. 78 In any event, the vitality of the section 2(c)
bribery cases may be open to question. 79 The difficulty is made more
severe by attempts to reconcile the questionable force of the bribery
cases with the elements of foreign relations intruding on the payments here considered. These elements may present the greatest
impediment to section 2(c)'s application to payments to foreign
officials."0
B. Commercial Bribery Under the Sherman Act
To the extent corporate activities such as the payment of bribes
to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining business have the
effect of furthering conspiratorial behavior that restrains trade or
leads to monopolization, the entire pattern of anticompetitive behavior, including the bribe, may be subject to prosecution. While
bribery, as yet, has not been explicitly at issue in cases involving
international trade, some private inducements to foreign governments to engage in anticompetitive behavior have been the subject
of litigation. In addition, bribery has been an element in a few
domestic antitrust cases.8'
77.

83 F.T.C. at 1273.

78. The "commerce" elements of § 2(a) would become indirectly relevant to § 2(c), if
only to the extent necessary to identify a cognizable discrimination.
79. The only apparent reference to the bribery cases by the Supreme Court occurred in
dicta in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). In

undertaking to add interpretive gloss to the Noerr doctrine, the Court included bribery of a
public purchasing agent as among the practices that may violate § 2(c), citing Rangen. This
reference is so remote from the Court's rationale that it is of little or no instructive value in

attempting to discern how the Court would deal directly with the discrimination issue under
§ 2(c).
80. See text accompanying notes 142-44 infra.
81. More often bribery questions come up under other federal laws; e.g., I.R.C. § 162(c),
which deals with bribes paid to foreign officials, and the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §
201 (1970), which deals with bribes paid to U.S. officials.
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The Noerr-PenningtonAntitrust Exemptioni

The natural starting point for an analysis of whether payments
made by United States corporations to foreign nationals for the
purpose of securing foreign business are prohibited by the Sherman
Act is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which states generally that
joint efforts to influence legislative or executive actions are not antitrust violations. In Eastern Ry. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight,Inc.,"2 the Supreme Court held that a Sherman Act
violation cannot be predicated on mere attempts to influence the
passage or enforcement of laws, even if for an anticompetitive purpose and by deliberate deception of public officials. In UMW v.
3 the Court added that such conduct is not illegal
Pennington,"
whether standing alone or as part of a broader scheme violative of
the Sherman Act. The doctrine appears to rest on two grounds: (1)
the Sherman Act was not intended to regulate political activities;
and (2) the constitutional right of petition. 4
Subsequent cases have narrowed the scope of the Noerr immunity. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 5 the
Supreme Court held Noerrplainly inapposite to a situation in which
defendants were "engaged in private commercial activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of laws." The Court concluded:
82. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The Supreme Court in Noerr expressly carved out an exception
to the antitrust immunity doctrine when the activities at issue are nothing more than an
attempt to interfere with the business relationships of competitors ("sham exception"). Thus
in factual settings similar to those contained in the complaints against Lockheed and Northrop, when one corporation bidding on a project bribes a foreign official for the purpose of
winning the contract, application of the Noerr exemption is at least questionable. To date,
the sham exception has arisen primarily in cases involving an alleged abuse of process.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (defendants
engaged in concerted action to institute state and federal actions to resist and defeat applications by plaintiff to acquire operating rights); Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d
272 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (defendants, including an FDA official, conspired to keep plaintiff's drug
off the market); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,234 (D.
Hawaii) (defendant airline opposed plaintiff airline's request before the Civil Aeronautics
Board for a subsidy). The policies on which the sham exception rests, however, may apply
as well to the commercial bribery situation. The Supreme Court, in protecting the constitutional right of petition, could not have envisioned that such protections would also be applied
to cases of commercial bribery. Further, influencing a public official by deliberate deception
is distinguishable from the bribery situation in that in the former case, prosecution may deter
others from petitioning the government in fear that the facts they present may subsequently
be proven false. In the latter case, the official is a party to the illegality; accordingly no
legitimate interest exists to be protected.
83. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
84. Annot., 17 A.L.R. FED. 645, 648 (1973).
85. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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[T]o subject [defendants] to liability under the Sherman Act for eliminating
a competitor from the Canadian market by exercise of the discretionary power
conferred upon Electro-Met of Canada [a co-conspirator] by the Canadian
Government would effectuate the purposes of the Sherman Act and would not
remotely infringe upon any of the constitutionally protected freedoms spoken
of in Noerr.'8

Recently, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was held "inappropriate" with respect to attempts to influence a foreign government.
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Oil & Gas Co.8" involved
efforts by defendants to instigate an international dispute over
sovereign rights to part of the Persian Gulf in order to block their
competitors' efforts to acquire oil deposits in that area. The court
dismissed the complaint, citing the "act of state" doctrine as controlling. In dicta, however, the court observed that the Noerr doctrine does not apply readily in a foreign context, because the right
of petition doctrine has limited applicability to petitioning of foreign governments.
A number of lower court decisions have distinguished the Noerr
doctrine in cases in which attempts to influence agencies or officials
involved conduct that was plainly illegal, including bribery. The
Ninth Circuit, in Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters
Local 150,8S held that the Noerr doctrine does not protect coercive
measures such as threats and duress. The court concluded that the
basic thrust of the Noerr doctrine is the protection of the first
amendment right to petition the government without regard to the
petitioner's intent and without the chilling effect of possible antitrust litigation. The court held that the doctrine was not intended
to protect those who employ illegal means to influence their governmental representatives. Two cases from the Fifth Circuit have held
the doctrine inapplicable when a government official is influenced
by false or misleading information.89 These cases, however, appear
to conflict with Noerr, in which the Supreme Court concluded that
deliberate deception of public officials, reprehensible as it may be,
is of no Sherman Act consequence.
In George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.,"0
86. Id. at 707-08.
87. :331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972).
88. 440 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1972).
89. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Marketing Assistance Plan, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
90. 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
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the First Circuit drew a distinction between attempts to influence
the government in political matters and attempts to influence the
government when acting as a consumer.' Whitten grew out of efforts of both parties to sell their products (pipeless swimming pools)
to public bodies acting under competitive bidding procedures. Defendant conceded that it had combined with dealers and others to
effect the use of its specifications in the public swimming pool industry, but argued that such activities do not constitute a violation
of the Sherman Act. The court held that antitrust immunity for
efforts to influence public officials in the enforcement of laws does
not extend to efforts to sell products to the government by means
of high pressure salesmanship, fraudulent statements, and threats
to public officials acting under a competitive bidding statute. The
scope and force of Whitten, however, is questionable. The First
Circuit's distinction between political and commercial activity is
belied by the fact that Pennington involved attempts to influence
the Secretary of Labor and a Tennessee Valley Authority official
with respect to government coal purchases. 2 Nevertheless, when
defendants are "engaged in private commercial activity no element
of which involved seeking to procure the passage or enforcement of
3
laws" the Noerr doctrine does not apply.
(2)

Domestic Antitrust Cases Involving Commercial Bribery

To date, United States courts have not held that bribery, by
itself, is an offense under the Sherman Act. In a case involving
bribery of a public official, the Seventh Circuit held that not every
unlawful act is an antitrust violation even if the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine does not immunize it from antitrust scrutiny. In Parmelee
Transport Co. v. Keeshin,"4 defendant was charged with improperly
influencing the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Plaintiff alleged that it would have been awarded a contract for the
business of transferring passengers and their baggage to and from
railway stations in Chicago, but for the illegal conduct of defen91. This distinction was later adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 410 F.2d
1096 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1972).
92. See also Household Goods Carriers Bureau v. Terrel, 452 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971)
(government purchases of mileage guides); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 245 F.'
Supp. 74 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (government purchases of pipe).
93. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962).
94. 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961).
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dant15 Defendant allegedly had secured the aid of the ICC chairman
by buying thirty tractors from the chairman's son and offering the
chairman an executive position. In finding no violation of the Sherman Act, the court observed:
An assertion that the competitive market for this contract was destroyed or
that the competition for it was eliminated is belied by the record. While one
competitor succeeded and necessarily the other failed, unmistakably there was
very strenuous competition. This unavoidable fact undermines the plaintiff's
charges under § §1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Nor is this result precluded by
the fact (which a court might well find on the case presented by way of offers
of proof) that the victory of the successful bidder was made easier by the
wrongful conduct of a public official. Assuming the record presented as to his
involvement reflects the truth (which we are for this purpose required to do),
any party damaged thereby has (and would have had, even before the enactment of the Sherman Act) a ground for relief in the courts of this country.
However, the use of conventional antitrust language in drafting a complaint
will not extend the reach of the Sherman Act to wrongs not germane to that
act, even though such wrongs be actionable under state law. We are not concerned with labels. Otherwise, an adroit antitrust lawyer might use his skill
in the use of words to convert many unlawful acts into antitrust violations. The
antitrust laws were never meant to be a panacea for all wrongs."

Three years later, in Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen,
Inc., 7 a district court, relying on Parmelee Transport Company,
held the Sherman Act was not violated when the evidence proved
bribery of an influential state employee which had a detrimental
restraining effect upon interstate commerce. Concluding that commercial bribery was not the type of activity proscribed by the Sherman Act, the court noted:
The evidence here proves only bribery of an influential state employee which
had a detrimental restraining effect upon interstate commerce. This is not the
type of misconduct within the purview of the concepts of a combination in
restraint of trade or monopoly as used in the Sherman Act . . . . [T]he
Sherman Act must be interpreted in the light of well understood common law
doctrines relating to monopolies and restraintsof trade such as contracts for
the restrictionor suppressionof competition in the market, agreements to fix
prices, divide marketing territories,apportion customers, restrict production
and the like. Nothing of that kind occurred here. This is a simple case of
11
buying influence, sometimes called commercial bribery ....
95. Plaintiff's offer of proof was that prior to September 30, 1955, pursuant to an oral
agreement with the railroads, it had engaged in the business of transferring passengers and
their baggage to and from the railway stations in Chicago. Evidence offered by plaintiff
indicated that the railroads found such service satisfactory. In 1955 the railroads, in an effort
to reduce costs, solicited bids from plaintiff and a number of its competitors. Plaintiff alleged
that it submitted the lowest bid and that but for the intervention of the chairman of the ICC,
it would have been awarded the contract. Id. at 795-96.
96. Id. at 804.
97. 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), affd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1965).
98. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
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Recently in Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,9'9
the Ninth Circuit, relying on Rangen, concluded that commercial
bribery, standing alone, does not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. In a footnote, however, the court stated:
This case does not present the question nor do we here decide under what
circumstances a claim of commercial bribery tied to claims of other acts tending to restrain trade would state a cause of action under §§1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.'0

Thus, although there is substantial authority for the proposition
that commercial bribery by itself is not cognizable under the Sherman Act,' 01 the courts appear to have left open the possibility that
the Act may apply when the bribe is tied to other acts tending to
2
restrain trade.1
(3)

Application to Bribery of Foreign Officials

Domestic antitrust cases involving commercial bribery are distinguishable from foreign bribery cases. The domestic cases appear
to be decided on the ground that other relief for the alleged wrong
was available to the plaintiff. In Parmelee Transport Company and
Rangen, the courts held that commercial bribery was cognizable
under state bribery statutes and implied that the impact on interstate commerce was insufficient to constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act. Although Congress presently is considering a number
of bills designed to prohibit bribery of foreign officials,' such activity, if properly disclosed to the SEC, is not prohibited at present by
United States laws. Absent congressional action, the Department of
Justice should consider applying the Sherman Act to situations involving bribery of foreign officials, especially when significant impact on foreign trade is demonstrated. In factual settings similar to
those alleged in the complaints against Lockheed and Northrop, in
99. 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976).
100. Id. at 687 n.20.
101. See also United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 162 (1965); Norville
v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 303 F.2d 281, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1962).
102. See also Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964), in which the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a Sherman Act complaint alleging
inducement of a public official. The court's holding gave a rather expansive reading to
plaintiff's complaint:
The complaint can be read as alleging that appellees' joint effort to influence the Attorney General was but one element in a larger, long-continued scheme to restrain and
monopolize "commercial banking ... within the State of Arizona."
Id. at 566.
103. See, e.g., S. 3133 (H.R. 13870), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 305, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
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which a corporation pays a bribe specifically to insure that a foreign
procurement officer buys its product to the exclusion of its principal
competitor, foreign commerce clearly is affected. The question
whether such an effect is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
Sherman Act is not amenable to generalized answers.
Application of the Sherman Act to bribery of foreign officials
is supported by a number of cases involving other types of private
inducements designed to encourage anticompetitive behavior. In
Continental Ore, the Canadian government appointed a Canadian
corporation to act as that nation's exclusive agent to purchase the
rare metal vanadium for allocation to Canadian industry. Without
authorization, the Canadian agent made purchases that discriminated against plaintiff and aided the Canadian agent's United
States parent in restraining and monopolizing the vanadium industry. Although bribery does not appear to have been involved, because the agent already had a vested interest in pleasing the U.S.
principal, the proscribed conduct clearly is analogous to bribery of
foreign officials.0 4 The Supreme Court holding that the defendant
violated the Sherman Act, emphasized that its decision was de05
signed to further the purposes of the Act.'
Continental Ore had rather unique facts that are not likely to
be present in most situations involving bribery of government procurement officers. First, Continental Ore involved a conspiracy that
included other private firms as well. The requirement of section 1
of the Sherman Act that proscribes only "contracts, combinations
. . . or conspiracies, in restraint of trade" may not be met by a
simple relationship between a single private firm and a single bribed
government official. One person acting alone cannot violate section
1, since agreement between two or more persons is necessary before
a violation of section 1 can be established. Further, concerted action
by persons within a single business enterprise does not constitute a
combination or conspiracy, and so long as the business enterprise
is regarded as an individual economic unit, it is permitted to act as
such.' 5 Thus an agreement between a corporation and one of its
agents that the latter will bribe a foreign official does not consititute
a combination in restraint of trade unless the agent can be considered sufficiently independent to have distinct and separate interests., 07
104. 1975 Hearings,supra note 1, at 91.
105. 370 U.S. at 707-08.
106. AREEDA, supra note 24, at 319.
107. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 469 (1962).
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Whether the bribed foreign official can be considered a party
to the conspiracy is unclear at present. In Parker v. Brown,'"' the
Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of the applicability of the Sherman Act when a state or its agent becomes a participant in a private agreement to restrain trade. In Harman v. Valley
National Bank of Arizona,' the Ninth Circuit reversed a district
court's dismissal of a Sherman Act complaint that alleged that
several Arizona banks conspired with the Attorney General of Arizona to restrain and monopolize commercial banking in Arizona,
and that pursuant to the conspiracy, the Attorney General closed
down plaintiffs bank. In both cases, however, more than one private
firm was involved in the alleged conspiracy. Further, in both
Continental Ore and Harman the alleged antitrust violation involved much more extensive conduct than merely inducing specific
discriminatory behavior by a specific government official. Thus,
unless the commercial impact of the bribe is significant, courts may
be reluctant to apply section 1 of the Sherman Act." 0
The need to show the actual or potential impact of a questionable payment to a foreign official presents even greater barriers to
relief under section 2 of the Sherman Act."' Under the preponderance of authority, a plaintiff must establish an economically significant and identifiable relevant market in cases alleging an attempt
to monopolize 1 2 as well as in those alleging actual monopolization.13
Moreover, when proving an illegal attempt to monopolize, the plaintiff generally must demonstrate both an unlawful intent"' and a
108. 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
109. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
110. See Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1961).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
112. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co.,
415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 245 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.
N.Y. 1965); Becken v. Safelite Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625 (D. Kan. 1965); United States
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See also Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (dictum). But see Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States
v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
114. Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Lorain Journal
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495,
rehearingdenied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
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dangerous probability of success."' The prospects that a plaintiff
will satisfy either standard, much less both, are not bright. The
specific intent that must be identified involves a much more culpable design than the general intent applicable to a monopolization
charge. Thus, in George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc.,"' the First Circuit
concluded that improper attempts to influence state purchasing
agents would not be per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, and that under the "rule of reason," the attempts would only
be unlawful if substantial market powers were coupled with a specific intent to injure a specific competitor or competitors.
The analogy to section 2 attempt situations is apt. Unless it can
be shown that a defendant possessed the intent to injure competitors to the point of driving them from the competitive arenas to
secure a monopoly position, an attempt to monopolize seems unlikely to be proven. In the typical reported bribery situation, the
payments allegedly are made to conclude a particular sale or a
number of sales to an official of a single foreign nation. Moreover,
these payments are typically not made with any hostile design on a
competitor's business existence but are intended principally to secure a limited amount of trade. Under these circumstances, proof
of the requisite unlawful intent would appear to be difficult to establish. Similarly, the ordinary bribery situation does not appear to
support a "dangerous probability of success" claim on which a successful attempted monopolization case depends, much less provide
a market share sufficiently definable to establish a monopolization
claim. In fact, the affected markets in virtually every instance
would be too thin-a single nation-and the time span 7 too
brief-often a single sale-to support a section 2 complaint."
IV.

THE

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

If the recipient of a questionable payment is in fact an official
of a foreign nation acting in an official capacity when he receives a
payment, the most substantial barrier to a successful charge under
section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act or sections 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act may result from application of the "act of state" doctrine." 8 This principle, originally applied to antitrust litigation in
115. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
116.
117.

508 F.2d at 559-60.
The typical bribery situation is dissimilar from that involved in Continental Ore,

in which a § 2 charge was sustained upon evidence that defendant had effectively monopolized the North American vanadium market.
118.

Closely related to the "act of state" doctrine are the doctrines of sovereign immun-
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the American Banana case," 9 has neither a constitutional nor statutory base, but is rooted in concepts of international comity and
judicial restraint. In general, the courts of the United States have
not considered themselves the appropriate arbiter of the legality or
propriety of foreign actions having a restraining influence on commerce in the United States. 20 Much of the rationale of Justice
Holmes' opinion in American Banana-dealing with the inability of
the Sherman Act to reach conspiracies formulated and occurring
abroad but having effect in the United States-has been criticized
and is probably not presently sound. 2' What does remain is the
basic rule that the Sherman Act does not apply when the allegedly
unlawful act is committed through the participation of a foreign
sovereign.
The threshold authoritative expression of the act of state doc-22
trine in the United States occurred in Underhill v. Hernandez,'
decided by the Supreme Court in 1896. In that case, the Court held
that the judiciary could not inquire into the legality of the kidnapping of an American citizen by a Venezuelan guerilla leader whose
government was later recognized by the United States. The underlying rationale of the Underhill case does not appear to have been
questioned in the eighty years since it was announced, and the
examination of the legality of a commercial payment to a foreign
officer seems far less appropriate than a determination of the legal
grounds for an abduction by a war lord.
Perhaps the most comprehensive explication of the doctrine is
found in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.'2 In facing a concededly discriminatory and unjust expropriation by the communist
government of Cuba, the Supreme Court held that the judiciary
ity and sovereign compulsion. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that official
agencies of foreign sovereigns are entitled to immunity from the process of United States
courts with respect to their sovereign diplomatic and political activities, even if these have

anticompetitive consequences. The doctrine of sovereign compulsion directs that a private
firm should not be held liable for certain violations of law that may occur because it is
compelled to act under risk of penalty by the foreign sovereign. In the typical bribery case,
however, neither of these defenses are likely to apply.
119. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
120. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92,
108 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
121. 213 U.S. at 353-59.
122. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
123. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The so-called "Sabbatino amendment," 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e)(2) (1970), designed to overrule some of the effects of the decision, is not relevant to
the present analysis, because it relates only to confiscations of property or property rights and
then only in a limited manner.
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could not examine the legality of acts by a foreign sovereign, even
when those acts may be patently violative of international law. The
Court stated:
[The doctrine's] continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the
proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of
24
the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.

The Court suggests, therefore, that the doctrine is not rigid and
inflexible but one that may be adapted to varying circumstances.
Two years before Sabbatino, in Continental Ore Co.,"' s the
Court suggested one area in which the act of state doctrine may be
inapplicable. One element of plaintiffs complaint was that defendant used its allocation authority to foreclose plaintiff from the
Canadian vanadium market. Reversing the rulings of the trial and
appellate courts, the Supreme Court determined that defendants
were not necessarily immunized from liability for the terminated
allocations by reason of Carbide's having acted, through its agent,
as an arm of the Canadian government.' 2 The Court stated:
A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of
the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries.'2

This statement constitutes neither a novel expression of law nor
deals in any way with the act of state issue. The Court seems to have
approached this issue in two ways. First, it indicated that when the
conduct of a foreign official is only one part of an overall conspiracy
to restrain trade, the defendants are not wholly insulated from liability. 28 The Court concluded that the evidence should go to a jury
for a determination whether injury resulted from defendants' conspiratorial acts. The Court's rationale in this respect is probably
inapplicable to the present situation, in which foreign action is not
only a part of the challenged conduct, but is the central operative
act giving rise to the claim. The second aspect of the Court's reasoning involved the unusual circumstance of a defendant acting both
as a commercial entity and as a governmental agency. Additionally,
the Court did not believe that the Canadian government would have
approved the discriminatory allocation by its delegate or that such
124. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
125. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
126. Id. at 704.
127. Id.
128. The Court in ContinentalOre relied on its earlier decision in United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), in which discriminatory foreign legislation was only one
element of a widespread private conspiracy to control production.
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action was consistent with Canadian law. The latter basis for the
Court's decision seems inconsistent with the customary judicial reluctance to probe the legality of a foreign agent's actions under the
laws of his own country. It may be that Continental Ore should be
limited to its peculiar facts, which are remote from those presently
under consideration.
OccidentalPetroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 121 is proba-

bly the most instructive analysis of the use of antitrust laws to
challenge payments to foreign officials. A complex, if not exotic,
factual situation arose from the Trucal states of the Persian Gulf,
resulting in a claim that the defendants had fabricated an international boundary dispute by which plaintiff was precluded from exploiting petroleum concessions through the action of various oilstate rules. The district court holding that the claim was barred
under the act of state doctrine was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Although plaintiff
claimed that the state action involved was fraudulently motivated
and unlawful under international law, the district court observed:
[S]uch inquiries by this Court into the authenticity and motivation of the
acts of foreign sovereigns would be the very sources of diplomatic friction and
complication that the act of state doctrine aims to avert. 30

In a recent decision, Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of
Cuba,"3 ' the Supreme Court refused to extend the act of state doctrine to a situation in which the foreign sovereign had acted in the
capacity of an entrepreneur. The action was brought by former owners of expropriated Cuban cigar companies against United States
importers to recover payments for cigar shipments made both before
and after the nationalization of the industry in Cuba. Cuban government appointees 3 ' intervened and the importers brought crossclaim against them seeking to recover payments made by the importers to the intervenors for prenationalization shipments. The intervenors countered with the contention that any repayment of the
obligation was a quasi-contractual debt which had Cuba as its situs,
and that their refusal to return the payments constituted an act of
129. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 950 (1972). This case was cited by Donald Baker in his House testimony as one imposing
barriers to United States antitrust attacks on bribes to officers of foreign governments. See
1975 Hearings,supra note 1, at 90.
130. 331 F. Supp. at 110.
131. 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
132. These were individuals appointed by the Cuban government to operate the cigar
industry. Id. at 1857.
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state. In accordance with the Sabbatino decision, the district court
directed the importers to pay the owners for prenationalization shipments and the intervenors for postnationalization shipments. 13 3 In
addition, the court directed the importers to set off from the amount
owed to the intervenors any payments made to them for prenationalization shipments. The Second Circuit, while agreeing with the
district court in all other respects, held that the intervenor's obligation to repay the importer was situated in Cuba and that their
repudiation of the obligation constituted an act of state. 134 The Su-

preme Court reversed, refusing to conclude that "the conduct in
question was the public act of those with authority to exercise sovereign power and was entitled to respect in our courts.' 1 35 The Court

held that no proof was offered that the failure of the intervenors to
repay the money reached the level of an "act of state," and further
stated:
No statute, decree, order or resolution of the Cuban government itself was
offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated her obligations in
general or any class thereof or that she had as a sovereign matter determined
to confiscate the amounts due three foreign importers13

The Ninth Circuit, in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,'37 held that the act of state doctrine does not require dismissal of an action brought under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act alleging a conspiracy to interfere with the importation into the
United States of Honduran lumber, when the challenged activity
does not appear to reflect official Honduran policy, neither Honduras nor any Honduran official was named as a party-defendant, and
the challenge does not threaten relations between Honduras and the
United States. Timberlane's basic claim alleged that officials of the
Bank of America and others located in Honduras and the United
States conspired to prevent Timberlane from milling lumber in
Honduras and exporting it to the United States. Defendants argued
that Timberlane's injury resulted from acts of the Honduran government in connection with the enforcement of a disputed security
interest in the lumber mill held by the Bank of America and cannot
be reviewed by United States courts. Relying on Continental Ore
Co. and Alfred Dunhill, the court held that the act of state doctrine
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1976).
96 S. Ct. at 1861.
Id.
797 ANTRrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) G-1 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 1977).
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is flexible and that "the doctrine does not bestow a blank-check
immunity upon all conduct blessed with some imprimatur of a
federal government.'

38

Applying the standard enunciated in Sab-

batino-potential for interference with our foreign relations-the
court held:
The so-called "act of state" here was the application by the courts and
their agents of the Honduran laws concerning security interests and the protection of the underlying property against diminution. The judicial proceedings
were initiated by Caminals, a private party and one of the alleged coconspirators, not by the Honduran government. There is no indicationthat the
court action reflected any official Honduranpolicy that Timberlane's efforts
should be crippled or that trade with the United States should be restrained.
Timberlane does not name Honduras or any Honduran officer as a defendant
or co-conspirator, nor challenge Honduran policy or sovereignty in any fashion
that appears on its face to hold any threat to relations between Honduras and
the United States. Under the circumstances, the act of state doctrine does not
require the dismissal of the Timberlane action."'

Alfred Dunhill and Timberlane may have a marked effect on cases

applying the act of state doctrine to bribery of foreign officials.
When the foreign sovereign officially condemns or quietly acquiesces in the payment of bribes to its officials, and the possibility of
disrupting foreign relations is remote, perhaps the act of state defense will be rejected.
In the most recent case involving the act of state defense, Hunt
4 the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal
v. Mobil Oil Corporation,"'
of Texas oilman Nelson Hunt's antitrust suit charging a conspiracy
among the major oil companies to preserve the competitive advantages of Persian Gulf crude oil over Libyan crude oil by causing
Libya to nationalize Hunt's holdings in that country. Holding the
act of state defense applicable, the court concluded:
[Tihe United States has officially characterized the motivation of the
Libyan government, the very issue which Hunt now seeks to adjudicate here.
The attempted transmogrification of Libya from lion to lamb undertaken here
does not succeed in evading the act of state doctrine because we cannot logically separate Libya's motivation from the validity of its seizure. The American judiciary is being asked to make inquiry into the subtle and delicate issue
of the policy of a foreign sovereign, a Serbonian Bog, precluded by the act of
state doctrine as well as the realities of the fact finding competence of the court
in an issue of far reaching national concern."'

Thus the act of state doctrine effectively may prevent successful challenge to payments to foreign officers in their official capaci138. Id. at G-3.
139. Id. at G-4 (emphasis added).
140. 798 ANTrTRUST & TRADE REG.REP. (BNA) A-9 (2d Cir. Jan. 25, 1977).
141. Id. at A-10. The Hunt decision is a classic justification of the applicability of the
act of state doctrine and should not be interpreted as expanding the defense.
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ties under the antitrust laws. The principle underlying the doctrine
may prevent judicial inquiry in the United States into the legality
of the officer's conduct under foreign law, since such an inquiry
would involve the courts in constructions of foreign law.' The only
exception to a general preclusion against United States attack on
these payments may arise when the official's receipt of payment is
repudiated by the foreign government itself, as has recently occurred to the extent that at least one former chief of state has been
jailed.4 3 Even under those circumstances, some basis may exist for
interposing the act of state doctrine, in view of the vicissitudes of
law and policy in some nations; however, the application of the
principle to circumstances resembling bribery that have been attacked by the foreign government itself seems to be an unduly cautious exercise of judicial restraint. In balance, however, attacks on
bribery of foreign officials under most circumstances would appear
to founder as a result of the act of state doctrine."'
V.

PRIVATE ACTIONS-THE PROBLEMS OF PROVING INJURY

Assuming inaction by the government, another hurdle standing
in the way of successful challenge to bribery of foreign officials
under the antitrust laws is the requirement set forth in section 4 of
the Clayton Act that a private plaintiff establish injury to his business or property caused by an antitrust violation.' While this burden falls on every plaintiff seeking recovery under the antitrust
laws, the difficulty may be particularly acute when the payment is
made to secure a single order or relatively few orders of astronomically costly products such as airplanes. If the private plaintiff is a
competing seller of these items, he would be required to show that
he would have made the sale but for the bribe, and that failure to
make the sale caused him injury. 4 ' Clearly, the road to recovery
142. See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 129899 (D. Del. 1970). The exceptions to the act of state doctrine derived from hostilities between
the United States and the foreign power involved are beyond the scope of this paper. See Ex
parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510 (1942).
143. Malcolm, Japan Vows Full Inquiry in Wake of Tanaka Arrest, N.Y. Times, July
28, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
144. Obviously, the doctrine has no application when a foreign business representative
rather than a foreign official is the recipient of a payment although proof of the agent's
capacity may be a problem. The other considerations discussed in this paper would apply to
payments not involving governmental functionaries.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
146. A foreign nation, having repudiated the action of a faithless official, may not face
so great a problem in attempting to recover alleged overcharges. Cf. Fitch v. KentuckyTennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
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would be more arduous than in primary line situations involving
competing sellers of fungible products who confront one another in
their attempts to make regularly recurring sales to the same custom47
ers. 1
The Ninth Circuit confronted treble damage claims by a competing seller in a commercial bribery context in the Rangen case.
The appellate court held that the trial court correctly found that
plaintiff had proved ascertainable damages when plaintiff displayed
that it successfully had made bids for a portion of the purchase of
fungible fish food to the state after termination of the bribery agreement.' The court held that while the market was contaminated by
the bribe no finding was necessary that plaintiff would have been
required to reduce its regular prices in order to obtain the state's
business.
No reason exists why the basic principles applicable to antitrust recovery by a plaintiff not yet selling in a particular market
would not apply to the unusual situation involved in the commercial
bribery of a foreign official to influence a single contract. At a minimum, a plaintiff seemingly could be required to show that he actively is attempting to sell the same kind of merchandise to the
same prospective customers.'49 Some objective evidence would be
required of the plaintiffs intention and preparation to enter the
market in question. According to one formulation, the objective
standards would include the following:
[T]he background and experience of the principals, including their previous
successes or failures in the same or a related business as well as possession of
the requisite skill and abilities . . . [;] the financial capability of the enterprise, which encompasses the extent of investment and the ability to finance
operations and to make necessary purchases . . .[;] [and] the taking of
substantial affirmative actions towards entry . . . .

Whether a plaintiff competing seller could make such a showing
would depend on the product and the national market involved as
well as his experience and capacities. Political and similar considerations, coupled with possible blind alleys in the discovery process,
could frustrate the recovery efforts of plaintiffs in many situations.
147. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
148. Rangen v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1965).
149. See Brooks, Injury to Competition Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 777, 802 (1961).
150. Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 308 (D. Colo. 1969).
See also Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 60,969 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

None of the impediments to the use of section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act or sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act against
United States companies' bribery of foreign officials appears by
itself to establish a clear barrier under present law. In combination,
however, the various difficult elements that must be established
and the various defenses that can be raised justify a less than sanguine view about the prospects that these antitrust provisions will
be effective weapons against these questionable payments. In balance, moreover, these provisions seem inappropriate as well as probably unequal to the task. Enormously important issues of national
policy, commercial ethics, and international relations are involved.
Recommendations have been made for comprehensive remedial legislation,'5 ' and Congress seems in a mood to deliberate the basic
questions. That avenue of national policy development seems far
preferable to placing hope in the problematical, at best, route offered by the antitrust laws.
151.

SEC REPORT, supra note 2, at 57-69.

